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Abstract: The New York State Environmental Quality Review Act, known around 
the New York legal community as SEQRA, triggers any time a public action may 
have an adverse impact on the environment.  The determinations of this process, 
intertwined with public actions such as, site plan approvals, variance requests, or 
any other land use or public action, are often challenged by those parties who 
are unsatisfied with the result.  This article discusses the extensive case history 
regarding when SEQRA actions are ripe for legal challenge. 
 
*** 
 
The issuance of land use and environmental permits by administrative 
agencies in New York, at both the state and local levels, typically involves two 
distinct determinations.  The first is whether the activity meets the substantive 
standards of the law and regulations enforced by the agency.  The second is 
whether the activity may have an adverse impact on the environment.  Where 
there may be such an impact, the agency makes a “positive declaration” of 
environmental impact and requires that an Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS) be completed.  The contents of the EIS are considered by the agency in 
approving, conditioning its approval of, or denying the permit.  The environmental 
review requirement is imposed by the State Environmental Quality Review Act, 
known as SEQRA.  
 
The dual nature of this process has led to some confusion in recent years 
as to when the statute of limitations is triggered for those who wish to challenge 
agency decisions subject to SEQRA.  For years, the courts seemed to hold that 
parties with standing to challenge agency actions had to wait until the substantive 
decision was made to litigate agency determinations.  “The general rule under 
SEQRA, as established by the case law, is that the moment of ripeness occurs 
only when an agency takes its final action approving or disapproving the 
underlying proposal.”  Michael B. Gerrard, Daniel Ruzow, Philip Weinberg, Envtl. 
Impact Rev. in N.Y., § 7.02 (1) (Mathew Bender 2003).  That rule appeared to be 
changing in recent years and this change has just been confirmed by the Court of 
Appeals.  See Stop-the-Barge v. Cahill, 2003 N.Y. Lexis 4004 (Court of Appeals 
December 2, 2003). 
 
An example of the rule requiring the substantive decision to be “final” 
before a SEQRA determination may be litigated is seen in Town of Coeymans v. 
City of Albany, 655 N.Y.S.2d 172 (3d Dep’t 1997). Here, the petitioners sought 
judicial review of the determination that designated the Department of 
Environmental Conservation’s regional office as the lead agency for the review of 
a proposed solid waste management facility. The court held that the lead agency 
designation was not a “final” determination.  Rather, it was, like some other 
SEQRA determinations, a preliminary step in the decision making process and, 
therefore, not ripe for judicial review.  The court stated that to hold otherwise 
would subject the entire SEQRA process to unrestrained review that would delay 
the process indefinitely.  As a corollary, the period of limitations applicable to a 
challenge to the lead agency determination does not begin to run until the 
environmental review process is complete. 
  
In Stop-the-Barge v. Cahill, 2003 N.Y. Lexis 4004 (Court of Appeals 
December 2, 2003), the Court of Appeals held that the issuance of the 
Conditional Negative Declaration (CND) was the “final” agency action under 
SEQRA and, therefore, triggered the statute of limitations.  For agency actions 
that are not listed in the SEQRA regulations as Type I actions (which 
presumptively may have an adverse impacts on the environment) the agency can 
issue a CND. This can be done where possible adverse impacts disclosed on an 
Environmental Assessment Form can be sufficiently mitigated by imposing 
conditions on the project in the early stage of project review.  The conditions 
imposed must be practicable and reasonably related to impacts identified in the 
record.  When a CND is issued, a full EIS is not required and no further 
environmental review is necessary. In other words, for SEQRA purposes, the 
matter is “final”.  
 
In Stop-the-Barge, New York City Energy (NYCE) submitted a request to 
the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) for a permit to 
install a power generator on a floating barge on the west side of the Wallabout 
Channel at the Brooklyn Navy Yard.  DEP became the lead agency under 
SEQRA and conducted an environmental review of the project. DEP was the 
lead agency under the regulations because it had the primary responsibility for 
the underlying approval of the power generator project under New York City law.  
DEP issued a CND, concluding that the project posed no significant impact to the 
environment and no environmental impact statement was required.  On February 
18, 2000, the CND became final and the SEQRA review was concluded.    
 
As often happens in land use and environmental approvals, another 
agency was involved. NYCE had to obtain an air permit under Article 19 of the 
Environmental Conservation Law from the State Department of Environmental 
Conservation (DEC).  It was at this stage that Stop-the-Barge, an opposition 
group, got actively involved.  Opposition to the project led to a DEC hearing and 
the petitioners and others submitted extensive written objections to the proposal 
on the grounds of inadequate environmental review.  Following the hearing, DEC 
approved NYCE’s permit application. 
 
The steps in this process relevant to the petitioner’s action challenging the 
environmental review included 1. the issuance of a final CND by DEP on 
February 18, 2000; 2. DEC’s issuance of the air permit on December 18, 2000; 
and 3. the commencement of petitioner’s action challenging the environmental 
review process on February 20, 2001.  Under C.P.L.R. § 217(1) a cause of action 
of this type must be initiated within four months of the action challenged.  The 
question is which of the actions involved triggered the running of the statute? 
 
The petitioners, Stop-the-Barge, commenced the present action one year 
after the CND became final. They claimed that the DEP’s issuance of the CND 
was arbitrary and capricious and violated SEQRA. The DEP, in turn, moved to 
dismiss the petition as time barred. The Court of Appeals agreed with DEP 
relying on Essex County v. Zagata and Gordon v Rush to reach its decision.  
 
In Essex County v Zagata, 91 N.Y.2d 447 (1998), the Court found that 
several factors must be considered to determine whether an agency action is 
“final”.  The first is whether the action imposes an obligation, denies a right or 
fixes some legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative process.  
Essex, 91 N.Y.2d at 453.  In other words, the agency action is “final” when the 
decision maker arrives at a "definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, 
concrete injury." Id.  “There must additionally be a finding that the injury 
purportedly inflicted by the agency may not be prevented or significantly 
ameliorated by further administrative action or by steps available to the 
complaining party.  If further agency proceedings might render the disputed issue 
moot or academic, then the agency position cannot be considered definitive or 
the injury actual or concrete."  Id. at 453-54. 
 
In Gordon v. Rush, 100 N.Y.2d 236 (2003) the court relied on the Essex 
factors to determine whether the issuance of a positive declaration under SEQRA 
was “final” and thus ripe for review.  A positive declaration of environmental 
impact requires the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement: a costly 
and time-consuming enterprise.  The Town of Southampton Coastal Erosion 
Hazard Board issued its own positive declaration for the project after the DEC 
had previously conducted a coordinated review resulting in a negative 
declaration, in which the Board had an opportunity but failed to participate.  
 
The court found that the issuance of a positive declaration imposed an 
obligation on the applicant, submission of the DEIS, which is an actual injury 
because the process requires considerable time and expense.  In addition, 
further proceedings would not lessen the injury.  The court held that the issuance 
of the positive declaration and not the assertion of jurisdiction by the Board alone 
was a “final” administrative action ripe for judicial review.  In disposing of the 
matter, the court determined that the Southampton Board should have brought 
an Article 78 action challenging the DEC’s issuance of the tidal wetlands permit 
upon completion of the coordinated SEQRA review and the issuance of DEC’s 
negative declaration.  How broadly this case will be applied to the issuance of 
positive declarations by lead agencies under SEQRA remains to be seen.  
Gordon is some authority for that proposition and Essex and Stop-the-Barge 
provide the factors and analysis that must be used to determine finality for the 
adjudication of SEQRA determinations such as positive declarations.  
 
In Stop-the-Barge, the court held that the DEP had reached a definitive 
position on February 18, 2000, when the public comment period ended because, 
at that point, its SEQRA review ended.  “[T]he issuance of the CND resulted in 
actual concrete injury to petitioners because the declaration essentially gave the 
developer the ability to proceed with the project without the need to prepare an 
environmental impact statement.”  Stop-the-Barge, 2003 N.Y. Lexis 4004 at *7.  
“Thus, to the extent that petitioners challenge the conclusions reached by DEP 
from its SEQRA review, the period of limitations must be measured at the latest 
from the time that the CND became final, on February 18, 2000.”  Id. 
 
The CND completed the SEQRA process and waiting ten months to 
challenge the process until the issuance of the air permit would be particularly 
unreasonable, said the court.   The court found that running the period of 
limitations from the issuance of the CND is consistent with the policy of resolving 
environmental issues and determining whether an environmental impact 
statement will be required at the early stages of project planning.  The court 
concluded that “[u]nder the circumstances presented [in the case], the CND was 
a final agency action for purposes of judicial review of petitioners’ SEQRA claim.”  
Id. at *8. 
 
 Prior to the Court of Appeals decisions in Gordon v. Rush and Stop-the-
Barge, the interpretation regarding the statute of limitation for SEQRA challenges 
appeared to be well settled: the running of the period of limitations commenced 
on the date of the agency’s underlying substantive decision, not completion of 
the SEQRA review.  In Long Island Pine Barrens Soc. Inc. v. Planning Bd. of the 
Town Brookhaven, 78 N.Y.2d 608 (1991), the court held that the statute of 
limitation period began to run upon the approval of the preliminary plat and not 
from the earlier act that was the last step in the SEQRA process.  Two Third 
Department cases began to cloud this old rule.  In McNeill v. Town Bd., 260 
A.D.2d 829  (3d Dept. 1999), the court held that the statue of limitations for 
SEQRA challenges began to run from the issuance of the negative declaration.  
In City of Saratoga Springs v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Wilton, 279 
A.D.2d 756  (3d Dept. 2001), the court again held that the statute of limitation 
period began to run from the filing of the SEQRA determination, a negative 
declaration.  Neither of these cases reached the court of appeals for a final 
determination on the issue. 
 
The new rule created in Gordon v. Rush and Stop-the-Barge initiates the 
running of the period of limitations when the SEQRA determination is “final”.   
This requires those who challenge SEQRA determinations involved in underlying 
land use and environmental permits to become involved early and to be diligent 
in spotting when the environmental process ends. In Stop-the-Barge, the 
petitioners offered no comments regarding the DEP’s issuance of the CND.  
Since the project required two permits, one can understand why an opposition 
group might conclude that its right to litigate survives until the second permit is 
issued.  Not so in these circumstances.  If the objection is to the adequacy of the 
required environmental review, then the matter is “final” and the period of 
limitations begins when the CND is finally issued. By analogy, where an agency 
issues a negative declaration (its finding that the activity will not have an adverse 
impact on the environment), the issuance of the negative declaration will trigger 
the statute.   
 
While imposing due diligence burdens on opposition groups, these rules 
provide definition for permit applicants and administrative agencies.  In these 
cases, they now know that SEQRA declarations are immune from attack after the 
period of limitations has run following the “final” SEQRA determination.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
